In-depth daily coverage of armed conflicts, insurgencies, terrorism, and security developments across Sub-Saharan Africa including the Sahel, East Africa, and the Great Lakes region.
Thursday, March 26, 2026 was defined by the UN Security Council's emergency session on eastern DRC, where acting MONUSCO chief Vivian van de Perre declared conditions "extremely tense" and documented the spread of drone warfare and GPS jamming to Kisangani, hundreds of kilometers from the eastern front. On the ground, M23 forces conducted a surprise withdrawal from a dozen positions in North Kivu's Lubero territory, while the Doha peace process was reported fully paralyzed. In Nigeria, the Air Force conducted precision strikes on ISWAP positions in Sambisa Forest, continuing a sustained aerial campaign following the March 16 Maiduguri suicide bombings; the Kebbi State ambush fallout left 11 security personnel and one civilian dead. In the Sahel, a large fuel convoy reached Bamako under FAMa escort, partially breaking JNIM's economic blockade, while IS-Sahel Province claimed six soldiers killed in an ambush in Niger's Tillabéri region. Ethiopia's Amhara region remained engulfed in the Fano insurgency with fighting across 26 administrative areas, and analysts issued explicit warnings of a potential Ethiopia-Eritrea regional war. South Sudan's civil war in Jonglei drove 280,000 fresh displacements, with FEWS NET projecting famine-level conditions through September. The IS Mozambique insurgency in Cabo Delgado persisted with active fighting around Catupa forest, while the future of Rwanda's force deployment hung on unrenewed EU funding. South Africa saw gang violence kill multiple residents in SANDF-patrolled Cape Town even as the National Police Commissioner faced criminal charges over a R360 million procurement scandal. The 14th WTO Ministerial Conference opened in Yaoundé, the first ever held on African soil, as Operation Epic Fury's oil price shock hit African fuel markets hard.
The most consequential diplomatic event of March 26 was the UN Security Council's open briefing on the DRC, convened under the US presidency, in which acting MONUSCO chief Vivian van de Perre delivered a stark assessment: the conflict was "extremely tense" and actively expanding. Her briefing documented drone strikes and GPS jamming affecting Bangoka Airport in Kisangani, Tshopo province, hundreds of kilometers west of the traditional eastern front lines. Both FARDC and M23/Rwanda forces were confirmed deploying Chinese CH-4 and Turkish TAI Anka drones, kamikaze UAVs, and fighter jets in and around urban areas, including Goma. Fighting was simultaneously pushing toward the Burundian border along the Ruzizi Plain, with approximately 5,000 Burundian troops now fighting alongside FARDC in South Kivu. The humanitarian toll Van de Perre reported: 6.4 million internally displaced, 26.6 million facing food insecurity, and 173 documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence since December 2025. US Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, who chaired the session, called resolving the eastern DRC conflict a matter of "highest priority" for the Trump administration and cited the Washington Accords signed December 4, 2025, with an April 15 compliance assessment deadline approaching.
On the ground, M23 forces were conducting a notable tactical withdrawal from positions in Lubero territory, North Kivu, which began March 23-24 and continued on March 26. Forces pulled back from at least 12 positions including Kipese, Munyakondomi, and Ivatama, moving southward. Lubero territory administrator Colonel Alain Kiwewa cautioned on March 26 that the movement may represent "tactical repositioning" rather than genuine concession to diplomatic pressure. Whether this reflected the March 17-18 Washington trilateral meetings or a strategic regrouping remained unclear. The Wazalendo pro-government militia in coordination with FARDC maintained pressure on M23 front lines during the withdrawal. In South Kivu, Reporters Without Borders released an investigation on March 26 revealing that M23 was using shipping containers to detain journalists and civilians in Goma, with up to 80 people packed per container without light or ventilation; some prisoners had died in custody. The Doha peace process between Kinshasa and M23 was simultaneously reported fully paralyzed, with DRC Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba attributing the blockage to Middle East geopolitics diverting Qatari mediators' attention. Two protocols initialed February 2 remained unsigned. What to watch: the April 15 Washington Accords assessment is the next critical inflection point; whether M23's Lubero withdrawal extends or reverses will be the primary ground indicator.
The Nigerian Air Force conducted precision strikes on ISWAP positions in Sambisa Forest, Borno State, on March 26, following credible intelligence of regrouping activity deep within the forest enclave. The air interdiction mission, part of Operation Hadin Kai's sustained aerial offensive, targeted ISWAP logistics and command positions. The strikes came ten days after the March 16 Maiduguri suicide bombings, which killed 23 to 27 people and wounded 146 in the most lethal attack on the Borno capital in recent years. Reports from Pointblank News indicated a concurrent ISWAP assault on the military camp at Kajeri in the Bama-Banki-Gwoza junction, with heavy casualties and the reported death of Major U.I. Mairiga. This attack fit a pattern of near-weekly coordinated assaults on military formations throughout March: Banki, March 13; Bita, March 14; multiple positions on March 18 killing three top ISWAP commanders and over 80 fighters. The Multinational Joint Task Force issued statements following each engagement but confirmed enemy losses in only a fraction of claims.
The northwest was simultaneously managing the aftermath of the Kebbi State ambush. Armed Lakurawa militants killed 9 soldiers, one police officer, and one civilian in Giron Masa, Shanga LGA, Kebbi State on the night of March 24, when troops responding to a distress call were ambushed and two military gun trucks were destroyed by fire. Governor Nasir Idris visited injured soldiers on March 25 and pledged government assistance to bereaved families. Kebbi remains one of the most exposed states to the Lakurawa group, which has roots in neighboring Niger and intensified cross-border operations after the 2023 Niger coup fractured bilateral security arrangements. A separate Hausa-Fulani communal clash in Alwasa, Argungu LGA, Kebbi, on March 23 had already killed three and displaced dozens. In Benue State, suspected Fulani militants on March 25 attacked civilians at Afubo Island near Makurdi with machetes, severing one victim's limb. In Borno State, troops on March 25 arrested 18 individuals caught supplying logistics to Boko Haram along the Gubio-Gudumbali axis. Nigeria ranked fourth most terrorized country globally in the 2026 Global Terrorism Index released this week, with terrorism fatalities up 46 percent to 750 in 2025.
A major fuel convoy escorted by Forces Armées du Mali (FAMa) arrived in Bamako on March 26, a concrete tactical victory against JNIM's economic blockade strategy, which has intermittently strangled the capital since September 2025. The convoy's arrival followed a reported informal agreement around March 22 in which JNIM agreed to pause attacks on fuel transports until the end of May, a deal that represents a form of de facto negotiation between the Malian government and the armed group it officially refuses to engage. The IMF approved the second review of Mali's Staff-Monitored Program on March 23, citing improving conditions, though analysts note the economy remains critically fragile given that over 70 percent of territory is controlled or contested by armed groups. Separately, Islamic State Sahel Province circulated a formal claim on March 25-26 for an ambush against Niger Army forces at Sanama in Tillabéri region, reporting six Nigerien soldiers killed. This follows IS-Sahel's March 9 ambush near Dessa village in the same region, which killed 21 pro-government militia members.
The diplomatic picture on March 26 centered on the Alliance of Sahel States and its relationship with continental institutions. AU High Representative Mamadou Tangara concluded a 72-hour visit to Niamey, meeting with Niger's Prime Minister and describing the AES as "an undeniable reality," signaling pragmatic AU recalibration toward the junta-led alliance. On March 26, AES-aligned media outlets reported an AU-facilitated dialogue framework between the AES and ECOWAS was in active development. The AES Unified Force, a 6,000-strong joint military mechanism headquartered in Niamey and launched in December 2025, represents the fourth such Sahel coalition attempt, following G5 Sahel's collapse. Its operational record remains limited. In Burkina Faso, media reports confirmed ongoing JNIM activity in the country's north and east, while March 10 attacks on a police detachment in Yamba killed approximately 30 people and a March 15 to 17 wave included an attack on Dourtenga that killed 12. Human Rights Watch documented JNIM execution of at least 34 civilians in Titao on February 14, with the pattern of violence against civilian communities continuing unabated.
Ethiopia on March 26 was managing three simultaneous armed conflicts with no signs of resolution. In the Amhara region, Fano insurgency fighting was documented across at least 8 zonal administrations and 26 woreda and city administrations during the week containing March 26. In the days immediately preceding, Brigadier General Gaddissa Diro was killed by Fano forces in Dega Damot woreda on March 22 during "Operation Wubante," and Fano claimed to have captured hundreds of Ethiopian National Defense Force prisoners of war in Gojjam over three days. On March 18, Fano fighters attacked government officials in Nefase Mewucha and Hamusit towns in South Gondar, killing at least five senior officials. Drone strikes were recorded in 4 woredas across 3 zones during March 16 to 22. Fano groups claim to control over 80 percent of rural Amhara, with ENDF concentrated in main towns. The December 2025 "peace agreement" signed with a minority Fano faction was rejected by the majority of Fano command structures and had not materially altered battlefield dynamics.
The international security community on March 26 was increasingly focused on the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff. The New Humanitarian published on March 23 an analysis explicitly warning that the confrontation risked escalating into a "regional mega-war" drawing in 10 to 15 countries. Both militaries had amassed forces along their shared border, and ENDF had been redeploying large formations from Amhara and Oromia toward Tigray since February 7, with heavy artillery, tanks, and personnel moving north. In Tigray, teachers, students, and administrators were staging protests across the region over 16 months of withheld federal salary subsidies affecting approximately 137,000 civil servants, a direct threat to the fragile implementation of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. In Oromia, an attack attributed to the OLA on the Metehara Sugar Factory in East Shewa zone on March 23 killed seven workers. What to watch: whether ENDF redeployments to Tigray create exploitable openings for Fano in Amhara; any kinetic incident along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, which could trigger the regional escalation analysts are warning of.
South Sudan on March 26 was in its third month of full-scale civil war following the collapse of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. President Kiir's March 2025 decision to place Vice President Riek Machar under house arrest shattered the power-sharing framework and triggered fighting between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces that has engulfed Jonglei State and surrounding areas. The SSPDF had captured Akobo, the last major SPLA-IO stronghold, around March 11, leaving the town deserted. Active fighting continued through March 26 in Nyirol, Uror, Duk, Ayod, and Canal and Pigi counties. Government airstrikes using incendiary weapons documented by Human Rights Watch struck populated areas. Save the Children and other humanitarian organizations had suspended operations in Jonglei, cutting off families from essential aid. By late March, at least 280,000 people had been displaced in Jonglei alone, with over 2.6 million internally displaced nationwide, according to UNMISS reporting.
FEWS NET's March 2026 key message update, covering conditions active through March 26, assessed Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity conditions in Jonglei and Upper Nile states with a risk of famine through September 2026. The assessment cited conflict displacement, market disruption, and humanitarian access denial as compounding drivers. International Crisis Group published its "Halting South Sudan's Slide Into War" brief this week, recommending immediate ceasefire negotiations and warning that December 2026 elections were now widely considered impossible under current conditions. Uganda had deployed troops to support the SSPDF in an arrangement viewed by UN experts as violating the arms embargo, while the AU had not publicly addressed the Ugandan deployment. What to watch: whether fighting expands toward Bor or Juba; depth of Ugandan military involvement; and whether the humanitarian corridor to Jonglei State can be reopened before the lean season intensifies.
IS Mozambique fighters in Cabo Delgado maintained active positions in the Catupa forest area on March 26, where they had overrun two FADM positions on January 31 and resisted recapture through the end of March. Heavy gunfire from the Catupa direction was heard on March 20 as FADM attempted to dislodge militants. ACLED's Mozambique Conflict Monitor, covering March 9 to 22, documented the most serious current institutional vulnerability: the EU financing of approximately 40 million euros supporting Rwanda's roughly 5,000-troop Cabo Delgado deployment expires in May 2026, and Rwanda has explicitly warned it may withdraw if funding is not renewed. A Rwandan withdrawal would remove the single most operationally capable external force in the province and almost certainly trigger ISM resurgence. The TotalEnergies LNG project, which resumed operations in January 2026, represents approximately 25 billion dollars in invested capital and is dependent on sustained security in northern Cabo Delgado. A March 15 incident in which Mozambican navy forces fired on six fishing boats off Mocímboa da Praia, killing 13 civilian fishermen, drew sharp condemnation from ACLED and continued a documented pattern of at least 85 such civilian deaths in 10 similar incidents since January 2024.
In Kenya, the Special Operations Group conducted an intelligence-led ambush near Sarira, Mandera County, close to the Somalia border, killing two suspected al-Shabaab militants around the time of Eid al-Fitr celebrations. The operation was publicly confirmed around March 26. The Mandera-Somalia border zone has seen sustained low-level al-Shabaab infiltration throughout 2025 and 2026, with the group using Kenyan territory as a logistical corridor. Kenya's security forces had increased operations tempo in the northeast ahead of major religious holidays, which al-Shabaab has historically used for high-visibility attacks. What to watch: whether Rwanda formally announces a funding decision for Cabo Delgado before the May expiry; whether ISM attempts a strategic offensive during the transition period if Rwandan withdrawal appears likely.
South Africa on March 26 was managing simultaneous security, institutional, and economic crises that intersected directly with national stability. In Cape Town's Khayelitsha township, multiple gang shootings within 24 hours left at least three people dead and several injured, part of a murder toll exceeding 30 for March in the city metro. President Ramaphosa had authorized a yearlong military deployment from March 1, with approximately 550 SANDF soldiers operating in Johannesburg from March 11; the announcement of approximately 800 troops being deployed to Cape Flats was pending for April. Simultaneously, the National Police Commissioner General Fannie Masemola was served with a court summons on March 25 over a R360 million procurement scandal linked to the Medicare24 SAPS health tender. Twelve senior officers had also been arrested and charged with corruption. The police minister was already suspended, and two deputy commissioners faced suspension over alleged cartel links. South Africa's Parliament Portfolio Committee on Police described the security cluster as being in "unprecedented crisis," with law enforcement leadership comprehensively compromised at the moment deployment-level decisions were being made.
The economic dimension of Operation Epic Fury's oil shock reached South Africa directly on March 26. Mineral Resources Minister Gwede Mantashe told the National Assembly on March 25 to 26 that cargoes destined for South Africa were passing through the Strait of Hormuz without interruption, citing South Africa's BRICS posture. However, oil prices had surged from approximately 66 to over 100 dollars per barrel since the February 28 US-Israeli strikes on Iran, and April fuel price adjustments were projected to be the highest single-month increases in South African history, with diesel under-recoveries reaching 950 cents per liter. Business Day South Africa estimated the Iran conflict was threatening the economy with sustained fuel price pressures affecting transportation, agriculture, and mining. In Zimbabwe, the government disclosed on March 26 that 15 citizens had died fighting in Ukraine after being recruited through trafficking syndicates using false employment advertisements; 66 survivors were being repatriated with Russian government coordination. Human Rights Watch had documented armed attacks on opposition figures in early March following resistance to Constitutional Amendment No. 3, which would extend presidential terms from five to seven years.
The WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference opened in Yaoundé, Cameroon on March 26, the first WTO ministerial ever convened on African soil, bringing together 4,000 delegates from 166 member states. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala acknowledged the conference was opening amid what she characterized as "the worst disruptions in the past 80 years," an implicit reference to Operation Epic Fury and its effect on global trade flows. The gathering's location in Cameroon was symbolically significant given that the host country simultaneously faces the Anglophone crisis in its northwest and southwest regions, where separatist violence has produced over 6,000 deaths and 700,000 internally displaced persons since 2017, and persistent ISWAP activity in the Far North along the Lake Chad Basin. In Belgium, four Ambazonia Defence Forces members arrested on March 3 on suspected war crimes charges were proceeding through judicial review, a significant development in international accountability efforts that Cameroon's government had not publicly welcomed.
In the Central African Republic, clashes between government forces backed by Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) and the Azandé Ani Kpi Gbè militia continued around Zémio in the Haut-Mbomou region, with the AAKG operating as a former Wagner-trained group turned government opponent following a 2025 peace deal it rejected. In the Republic of Congo, African Arguments published analysis on March 26 documenting that "Operation Zéro Kuluna," a post-election security crackdown following President Sassou Nguesso's March 15 re-election with 94.82 percent of votes cast, had resulted in at least 200 extrajudicial executions since September 2025. Ghana's March 24 signing of Africa's first Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union, covering counterterrorism, border management, maritime security, and cybersecurity backed by 50 million euros, was described on March 26 by ISS Africa as the most concrete institutional effort yet to fortify coastal West Africa against Sahel jihadist spillover. ECOWAS chiefs of staff had previously endorsed a counter-terrorism brigade of 1,650 soldiers from six member states, with an inaugural deployment timeline now under active planning.